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THE NINTH CIRCUIT CONSTRAINS  
NON-ENFORCEABLE PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSERVATION 
AGREEMENTS 
BENJAMIN HANNA* 
Abstract: In 2009, Ruby Pipeline, L.L.C. proposed to build a 678-mile pipeline 
from Wyoming to Oregon that would cross through the critical habitat of endan-
gered species. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service worked with Ruby to design a Conservation Action Plan con-
sisting of voluntary measures aimed at mitigating the effects of the pipeline on 
nine endangered fish species. Relying on the plan, federal agencies approved the 
pipeline project.  Environmental groups challenged the agencies’ decision to rely 
on a voluntary conservation plan. In Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bu-
reau of Land Management, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that the agencies violated the Endangered Species Act because the Act requires 
enforceable rather than voluntary conservation plans. This Comment argues that 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision correctly clarifies the role that public-private conser-
vation plans may play within the ESA in a way that will ensure the protection of 
endangered species. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past thirty years, the consumption of natural gas in the United 
States has increased steadily.1 To keep up with demand, the gross amount of 
natural gas withdrawn from United States soil has surged nearly twenty-five 
percent since 2005—from just more than 65 billion cubic feet per day 
(“Bcf/d”) to more than 81 Bcf/d.2 Experts predict that the use of natural gas 
will continue to increase through 2040.3 As consumption has increased, so has 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 U.S. Natural Gas Total Consumption, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.
eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9140us2a.htm, available at http://perma.cc/39LA-MCN5. 
 2 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., BEST ESTIMATE OF GROSS WITHDRAWALS BY AREA BY MONTH, 
BCF/D (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/data_publications/eia914/eia914.html 
and http://perma.cc/SJT9-LATA (follow “Figure Data” hyperlink under State Natural Gas Gross With-
drawals chart to access spreadsheet). 
 3 Market Trends—Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 2, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/
forecasts/aeo/MT_naturalgas.cfm, available at  http://perma.cc/9GWK-ET3V. 
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investment in pipelines to transport natural gas throughout the country.4 Hun-
dreds of thousands of miles of natural gas pipelines exist already, and thou-
sands more are in the construction or approval phases.5 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is charged with re-
viewing and approving proposed natural gas pipeline projects.6 When approv-
ing a project, FERC must square the proposed pipeline with the requirements 
of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).7 This includes an affirmative duty to 
assess the impact of the proposed project and to prevent the harming of feder-
ally endangered or threatened species, or prevent adverse modifications to the 
critical habitat of such species.8 When projects are proposed by private enti-
ties, these entities are also involved in the impact assessment required by the 
ESA.9 
In proposing a project to the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which en-
forces the ESA, a proposing agency and private entity may include conserva-
tion measures aimed at protecting the affected endangered species.10 These 
measures, sometimes called Conservation Action Plans (CAPs), constitute an 
agreement between the FWS, the federal action agency, and the private appli-
cant, and become an official component of the project.11 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Over Half of U.S. Natural Gas Pipeline Projects in 2012 Were in the Northeast, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (March 25, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10511#investment, 
available at http://perma.cc/BY3Q-DBWZ (showing a major boom in pipeline investment between 2006 
and 2012). 
 5 About U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_
gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2013), available at 
http://perma.cc/XT5D-X8VX (showing that as of 2008, 305,000 miles of natural gas pipelines were 
already in existence); see Approved Major Pipeline Projects (2009 to Present), FED. ENERGY REG. 
COMM’N (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/pipelines/approved-projects.
asp, available at http://perma.cc/S528-TUYM. 
 6 Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717a(9), 717f(c)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring FERC to approve all 
proposed natural gas transmission facility projects). 
 7 See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3) (2012) (requiring federal agencies to con-
sult with the Department of the Interior before undertaking projects that might harm endangered spe-
cies). 
 8 Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
 9 See Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. Forsgren, 336 F.3d 944, 949 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the 
private company’s role in negotiating an agreement for mitigation of a project’s effects on endangered 
species). 
 10 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2013); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT CON-
SULTATION HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING SECTION 7 CONSULTATIONS AND CONFER-
ENCES 4-19 (1998), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/laws/esa_section7_handbook.pdf 
and http://perma.cc/7G2Z-FJV4. 
 11 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 698 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 
2012); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 10, at xii. Public-private conservation agreements are 
referred to by a variety of names, such as “conservation agreements,” “conservation measures,” or 
“mitigation measures.” See Selkirk, 336 F.3d at 955 (using the term “Conservation Agreement”); 
Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1987) (using the term “mitigation measures”); 
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 10, at xii (using the term “conservation measures”). To 
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The role of a CAP was the primary issue in Center for Biological Diversi-
ty v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management.12 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit found that during consultation, the FWS improperly used the 
CAP negotiated by FERC, and the private applicant Ruby Pipeline, L.L.C., 
(“Ruby”), to circumvent the requirements of the ESA.13 This Comment argues 
that the Ninth Circuit’s decision correctly reaffirms the role that CAPs may 
play under the ESA and provides important guidance for future agreements 
between private parties and federal agencies.14 Although public-private mitiga-
tion efforts during ESA consultation should be encouraged, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision clarifies that these accords may not serve as shortcuts to the goal of 
protecting endangered species.15 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Ruby submitted an application to FERC in early 2009 to build a 678-mile 
natural gas pipeline from Wyoming to Oregon.16 The route for the 42-inch-
diameter pipeline encompassed approximately 2,291 acres of federal lands, so 
Ruby also filed with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to obtain right-
of-ways over these lands.17 During FERC’s review of Ruby’s application, the 
agency requested a formal consultation with the FWS to determine the pro-
posed pipeline’s potential impact on endangered or threatened species and their 
habitats.18 
The pipeline would cross 209 bodies of water that fall within or are con-
nected to critical habitats of nine listed endangered species of fish, and the 
FWS determined that the project would adversely affect these species.19 The 
FWS’s biological opinion identified five species—Lahontan cutthroat trout, 
Warner sucker, Lost River sucker, shortnose sucker, and Modoc sucker—that 
would be adversely affected by the project’s water crossings.20 The four other 
speciesColorado pikeminnow, humpback chub, razorback sucker, and 
bonytail chubwould be adversely affected by the proposed depletion of sur-
face and groundwater during the construction phase.21 
                                                                                                                           
avoid confusion, this Comment uses the term “Conservation Action Plan,” used by the parties in Cen-
ter for Biological Diversity. See 698 F.3d at 1109. 
 12 698 F.3d at 1109. 
 13 See id. at 1108–09, 1119. 
 14 See infra notes 88–109 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 88–109 and accompanying text. 
 16 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1106, 1108. 
 17 Id. at 1105–06. 
 18 Id. at 1108. 
 19 Id. at 1106. 
 20 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION 79 (2010), available at http://goo.gl/
nXhZ2c and http://perma.cc/AC5R-5W87. 
 21 Id. at 55, 76. 
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As a result of these findings, the FWS sent a number of suggested 
measures to Ruby that would address the project’s impact on listed species and 
their habitats.22 The FWS requested that Ruby review the suggestions and file 
a final CAP that would become an official part of the project.23 FERC objected 
to including the CAP in the final proposed action.24 FWS then revised the 
agreement with Ruby to include language that specified that the CAP was not a 
part of the proposed action for ESA purposes.25 Ruby’s pledge to implement 
certain conservation measures was formalized in a “Letter of Commitment,” 
with a list of measures specifically tailored to address the project impacts iden-
tified by the FWS’s initial Biological Opinion.26 Ruby committed to funding 
seven of the twelve measures, and predicted that each of the actions would be 
initiated within five years of receiving approval from FERC.27 The letter did 
not identify any penalties or consequences to be imposed upon Ruby should it 
fail to carry out the measures.28 
Despite internal protests, the FWS determined that Ruby’s voluntary 
measures were “reasonably certain to occur” and thus factored the measures 
into its final Biological Opinion.29 Including Ruby’s CAP measures as cumula-
tive effects, the FWS concluded that the project would not jeopardize the con-
tinued existence of the listed species nor adversely modify critical habitat.30 In 
turn, the BLM relied on the FWS’s finding of no jeopardy in issuing its Record 
of Decision.31 On July 30, 2010, FERC issued Ruby an initial notice to pro-
ceed, and the construction of the pipeline commenced the next day.32 
On the same day construction began, the non-profit group Center for Bio-
logical Diversity (CBD) petitioned the Ninth Circuit pursuant to the Natural 
Gas Act to review the BLM’s issuance of the rights-of-way and the FWS’s 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1110. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id.; Letter of Commitment by Ruby Pipeline Regarding the Endangered Species Act Conserva-
tion Action Plan for the Ruby Pipeline Project 2 (March 18, 2010) [hereinafter Letter of Commit-
ment], available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/nv/nepa/ruby_pipeline_project/rod/
attachment_g.Par.59264.File.dat/ESA_Letter_of_Commitment_Final_3-18-10.pdf and http://perma.
cc/5UTS-6ASQ. 
 25 Letter of Commitment, supra note 24, at 2. 
 26 Id. (attachment 1). A Biological Opinion evaluates a proposed project for its effect on endan-
gered species. Infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
 27 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1111. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 1112, 1117–18; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 20, at 101. 
 30 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1112. 
 31 Id. at 1106. A finding of “no jeopardy” means that after a comprehensive assessment, the FWS 
found that the project will not jeopardize the continued existence of the affected species. See infra 
notes 48–54 and accompanying text. 
 32 Ruby Natural Gas Pipeline Begins Service Today (July 28, 2011), U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(July 28, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2410#, available at http://perma.cc/
3TVE-ZQDW. 
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Biological Opinion.33 The CBD argued that the Biological Opinion incorrectly 
relied upon Ruby’s CAP.34 Less than three weeks later, on August 18, 2010, 
CBD filed an emergency motion to stop the construction of the pipeline pend-
ing appeal.35 The Ninth Circuit granted review of the federal respondents’ ac-
tivities but denied the emergency motion seeking injunctive relief.36 In the 
meantime, Ruby intervened to join the federal agencies as a respondent.37 
Many other parties joined CBD and petitioned the Ninth Circuit to review 
the pipeline project, and the court eventually consolidated the parties to resolve 
the common issues regarding the ESA.38 The court held that the FWS had im-
properly included Ruby’s CAP in its jeopardy analysis because the CAP was 
unenforceable.39 This action violated the ESA, according to the Court, because 
when the CAP measures are unenforceable, neither the FWS nor the private 
party is accountable for the conservation of the endangered species.40 The Bio-
logical Opinion was thus invalidated and remanded to the FWS to either make 
the CAP measures enforceable or to exclude the CAP’s benefits from the jeop-
ardy analysis.41 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) imposes upon all federal agencies a 
duty to conserve endangered and threatened species and to utilize agency pow-
ers in furtherance of the ESA.42 Two provisions in the ESA work together to 
place this duty on agencies: § 9, which prohibits any person from taking a 
member of a protected species, and § 7, which requires federal agencies to 
prevent violations of § 9.43 Section 7 specifically requires that any action au-
                                                                                                                           
 33 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1) (2012); Joint Opening Brief of Petitioners Center for Biological Diver-
sity and Defenders of Wildlife et al. at 2, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d 1101 (Nos. 10-72552, 
10-72356, 10-72762, 10-72768, 10-72775) [hereinafter CBD Opening Brief]. 
 34 CBD Opening Brief, supra note 33, at 7. 
 35 Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal Under Circuit Rule 27-3 at ii, 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d 1101 (No. 10-72356). 
 36 Order at 1, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d 1101 (No. 10-72356). 
 37 Ruby Pipeline, L.L.C.’s Motion to Intervene as Respondent at 1, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 
698 F.3d 1101 (No. 10-72356). 
 38 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1106; Order at 1, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 
F.3d 1101 (Nos. 10-72552, 10-72356, 10-72762, 10-72768, 10-72775). 
 39 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1119. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 1128. Because the court denied the Center’s emergency motion to halt the project, con-
struction continued and the pipeline was completed, and therefore conservation measures were di-
rected at mitigating the adverse effects on the fish species during operation rather than construction. 
See id. at 1106 n.2. 
 42 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (2012). 
 43 Id. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1)(B); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 
698 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing the interlocking relationship between § 7 and § 9). 
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thorized by a federal agency be unlikely to jeopardize endangered or threat-
ened species, or adversely modify critical habitat.44 
To ensure compliance with § 7, agencies must determine whether any en-
dangered species might live in the area where the proposed action would oc-
cur.45 When endangered species might be present, the agency must prepare a 
biological assessment.46 If the biological assessment reveals potential adverse 
effects on protected species, the agency reviewing the action (the “action agen-
cy”) must formally consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).47 The 
FWS then completes a Biological Opinion, which evaluates whether the pro-
posed project will jeopardize the continued existence of the protected species 
or adversely modify the species’ critical habitat.48 
When making a jeopardy determination, the FWS must evaluate both the 
“effects of the action” and its “cumulative effects” on the listed species or crit-
ical habitat.49 The “effects of the action” are those direct and indirect effects of 
a proposed project; included in this are interrelated actions that are connected 
to the primary project.50 To determine whether an action is interrelated to the 
primary project, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit uses a but-for 
causation test: but for the primary project, the action at issue would not take 
place.51 “Cumulative effects” are the effects of unrelated private or state activi-
ties in the proposed project area that are reasonably certain to occur in the fu-
ture.52 Cumulative effects must be considered in a jeopardy determination.53 
These effects are only background considerations, because they are the result 
of activities outside the action agency’s control, and thus the action agency has 
no power or obligation to see that these activities materialize.54 
                                                                                                                           
 44 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 45 Id. § 1536(c)(1). 
 46 Id. The purpose of a biological assessment is to consider the potential effects of an action on 
endangered species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(a) (2013). 
 47 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a); id. § 402.02 (defining “Formal Consultation” as a process between a 
federal agency and the FWS). 
 48 Id. § 402.14(g)(4). 
 49 Id. § 402.14(g)(3). Courts use the term “jeopardy determination” to describe the FWS’s analy-
sis of whether a project will jeopardize the continued existence of a protected species or adversely modi-
fy the species’ critical habitat. This is a component of the Biological Opinion. Ctr. for Biological Diversi-
ty, 698 F.3d at 1109; Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. Forsgren, 336 F.3d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 2003); 50 
C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3). 
 50 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. If the effects of the action change during the project, or if previously un-
considered effects come to light, the action agency must reinitiate consultation with the FWS. Id. 
§ 402.16(b)–(c). New or modified cumulative effects do not require reinitiation of consultation. See id. 
(notably lacking mention of cumulative effects for purposes of reinitiating consultation). 
 51 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1113; Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1387 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
 52 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2013). 
 53 Id. § 402.14(g)(3). 
 54 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1113–14. 
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In Sierra Club v. Marsh, the Ninth Circuit in 1987 reviewed an agreement 
between a project applicant and a federal agency to implement conservation 
measures.55 The Conservation Action Plan (CAP) in Marsh established a trade 
in which the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) permitted forty-four acres of 
marshland habitat to be destroyed to build a flood control channel.56 In ex-
change for this habitat destruction, the County of San Diego (“County”), the 
project applicant, was required to acquire 188 acres of marshland to create a 
publicly owned wildlife refuge.57 The Corps evaluated the project relying on 
the creation of the wildlife refuge in its analysis.58 When the County failed to 
acquire the mitigation wetlands, the Corps did not reevaluate the project’s im-
pact on endangered species.59 The Ninth Circuit held that this failure to reeval-
uate was a violation of § 7 because the Corps relied on a project plan that in-
cluded the creation of a wildlife refuge, without ensuring that the County 
would actually create the refuge.60 By allowing the project to continue after the 
County failed to acquire the mitigation land, the Corps was not ensuring the 
protection of the endangered species.61 
In Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. Forsgren, an environmental group 
sued the United States Forest Service (USFS) and the FWS in 2001 for relying 
on an agreement with a private timber company seeking to build logging roads 
through grizzly bear habitat.62 The FWS initially found that building more 
roads through the habitat would adversely affect grizzly bears.63 As a result of 
that finding, the parties created a CAP with mandatory measures designed to 
minimize and offset the effects of the logging roads on grizzlies.64 The CAP 
was then incorporated into the terms of the FWS’s Biological Opinion.65 Sel-
kirk Conservation Alliance challenged the Biological Opinion and claimed that 
the agencies were wrong to incorporate the CAP in the Opinion.66 The Ninth 
Circuit disagreed and found that the agencies acted properly by incorporating 
the CAP into the Biological Opinion because the CAP contained mandatory 
and enforceable measures.67 The Ninth Circuit qualified its finding, however, 
by stating that “federal agencies cannot delegate the protection of the environ-
                                                                                                                           
 55 816 F.2d at 1384–89. 
 56 Id. at 1385. 
 57 Id. at 1380, 1385. 
 58 Id. at 1379–80, 1385. 
 59 Id. at 1381. 
 60 Id. at 1386. 
 61 Id. 
 62 336 F.3d 944, 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 63 Id. at 954–55. 
 64 Id. at 955, 956 n.5. 
 65 Id. at 953 n.4 (explaining that the CAP was incorporated into the terms and conditions of the 
Biological Opinion). 
 66 Id. at 954. 
 67 Id. at 956 & n.5 (noting that all parties implicitly assume the CAP is legally enforceable). 
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ment to public-private accords . . . [and] the agencies must vigorously and in-
dependently enforce environmental laws.”68 
In National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, the 
Ninth Circuit in 2008 reviewed a Biological Opinion that concluded that a se-
ries of hydroelectric dams would not jeopardize several species of salmon.69 
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) concluded that the salmon 
would not be jeopardized in part because it relied on the future installation of a 
fish passage device.70 The proposed action, however, included no binding as-
surance that these devices would actually be installed.71 The Ninth Circuit up-
held the district court’s finding that a Biological Opinion may not rely on non-
binding future improvements.72 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has similarly held that 
a federal agency’s duty to conserve endangered species may not be satisfied by 
voluntary measures.73 In Florida Key Deer v. Paulison, the Eleventh Circuit in 
2008 found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) violat-
ed § 7 when it implemented only a voluntary program incentivizing communi-
ties to adopt habitat conservation plans.74 In rejecting FEMA’s program, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that voluntary measures do not satisfy § 7 because they 
are not likely to conserve endangered species.75 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a Conservation Action 
Plan (CAP) agreed upon by a federal agency and project applicant must be 
enforceable within the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to factor into the Fish 
and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) jeopardy determination.76 The court set aside the 
FWS’s Biological Opinion because it improperly relied on a CAP created by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Ruby Pipeline, 
L.L.C. (“Ruby”).77 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. at 955. 
 69 524 F.3d 917, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 70 Id. at 935. 
 71 Id. at 935–36. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Florida Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1145, 1147 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 74 See id. (noting that agencies do not satisfy their obligations if they carry out an insignificant 
measure that does not actually conserve endangered species). 
 75 See id. The Eleventh Circuit recognized that although agencies might have discretion in how to 
carry out their ESA obligations, total inaction is not an option. Id. at 1146. The court noted that FE-
MA failed to show a single community that had signed up for its plan, which demonstrated that volun-
tary conservation programs can amount to total inaction. Id. at 1147. 
 76 698 F.3d 1101, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 77 Id. at 1110, 1119. 
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The FWS’s classification of the CAP measures as “cumulative effects” in 
the Biological Opinion was crucial to the court’s holding.78 The court pointed 
out that cumulative effects “are essentially background considerations, relevant 
to the jeopardy determination but not constituting federal actions and so be-
yond the action agency’s power to effectuate.”79 Classifying the CAP measures 
as cumulative effects removes measures in the CAP from the requirements of 
§ 7, and trusts the implementation of the CAP to the discretion of the private 
applicant.80 
The court rejected the respondents’ claims that the CAP measures were 
reliable because the measures could be enforced by FERC and the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM).81 The court found this arrangement misguided be-
cause it permitted the action agencies to weigh their own priorities against the 
protection of the endangered species—a balancing act that is not a part of the 
ESA.82 In rejecting the respondents’ argument, the court noted that Congress 
entrusted the federal government’s protection of endangered and threatened 
species solely to the provisions of the ESA.83 
The court further held that the CAP measures were “unequivocally inter-
related” with the proposed pipeline project.84 Ruby described the CAP 
measures as independent of the FERC proposed project, and outside the pur-
view of § 7 of the ESA.85 The Ninth Circuit, however, noted that a quid-pro-
quo relationship clearly existed between Ruby and FERC such that Ruby 
would not implement the CAP measures without the approval of the project.86 
As the measures were dependent on the project, they were not cumulative ef-
fects and instead should have been categorized as effects of the proposed ac-
tion.87 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id. at 1117, 1128. 
 79 Id. at 1113–14. 
 80 See id. at 1119. 
 81 See id. at 1115–16. The BLM could enforce the terms of the CAP under the Mineral Leasing 
Act regulations by suspending or terminating rights-of-way should Ruby violate the terms of the 
agreement. See id. at 1116 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 2886.17). The court was not convinced that the BLM 
would terminate the right-of-way for a completed pipeline project already in operation. Id. FERC is 
required by the Natural Gas Act to impose penalties for violations of the terms and conditions of the 
CAP, but FERC has the discretion to determine the magnitude of the penalties. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717t–1 (2006)). 
 82 See id. The court reiterated that “Congress considered and rejected language that would have 
permitted an agency to weigh the preservation of the species against the agency’s primary mission.” 
Id. at 1115–16 (quoting Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 83 Id. at 1117. 
 84 Id. at 1118. 
 85 Letter of Commitment, supra note 24, at 2. 
 86 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1118. 
 87 See id. at 1118–19 (finding that reliance on the CAP would have been proper only if the CAP 
measures were included in the Biological Opinion as part of the project rather than as cumulative 
effects). 
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The Ninth Circuit’s insistence that CAP measures be enforceable to be re-
lied upon by federal agencies is consistent with the court’s precedent.88 The 
decision in Center for Biological Diversity affirms the Ninth Circuit’s require-
ment that “[e]ven given the cooperation of private entities, [federal] agencies 
must vigilantly and independently enforce environmental laws.”89 Further-
more, the court’s holding in Center for Biological Diversity is consistent with 
the ESA’s requirement that federal agencies utilize their power in furtherance 
of the statute’s objectives.90 The decision thus strengthens the protection of 
endangered species by ensuring that when such species are affected by a pro-
ject, federal agencies adhere to the provisions of the ESA rather than other 
mechanisms.91 
The Ninth Circuit in Center for Biological Diversity clarified how the 
FWS should rely on mitigation promises when determining whether a project 
will jeopardize an enlisted species.92 The court’s decision resolved the use of 
CAPs in a way that the Ninth Circuit had previously left to inference or rele-
gated to footnotes.93 The ESA’s statutory scheme, and the regulations interpret-
ing that scheme, impose procedural and substantive duties upon federal agen-
cies to protect endangered species.94 Simultaneously, private actors and federal 
agencies are expected to work together to allow projects to move forward 
while preserving and aiding in the recovery of listed species.95 The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s holding in Center for Biological Diversity helps define how these public-
private mitigation plans may be used in accordance with the ESA.96 
The decision in Center for Biological Diversity clarifies an issue not di-
rectly explained by the court in Sierra Club v. Marsh.97 In Marsh, the Army 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. Forsgren, 336 F.3d 944, 956 n.5 (explaining that federal 
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Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) made a wetlands exchange part of the project 
plan.98 The court in Marsh found that the Corps was required to reinitiate con-
sultation with the FWS when the wetlands exchange failed.99 The court’s find-
ing implies that the wetlands mitigation exchange was considered an effect of 
the action because only modifications to effects of the action required new 
consultation.100 In Center for Biological Diversity, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
why categorizing mitigation measures as effects of the action is crucial to the 
ESA.101 By relegating Ruby’s CAP measures to cumulative effects in the Bio-
logical Opinion, the FWS was ensuring that the measures were beyond the 
agencies’ power to enforce.102 
The court in Center for Biological Diversity also clarified confusion on 
the enforceability of mitigation measures in Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. 
Forsgren.103 The court in Selkirk held that the Biological Opinion properly 
relied upon the CAP to which the United States Forest Service (USFS), the 
FWS, and the private timber company had agreed.104 The court’s explanation 
as to how the Biological Opinion had properly incorporated the CAP was lim-
ited and stated that the CAP was mandatory because the mitigation measures 
were enforceable under the ESA.105 In Center for Biological Diversity, Ruby 
pointed to Selkirk as an example of the court allowing the FWS to rely on 
promised mitigation measures as “cumulative effects” when performing a 
jeopardy determination.106 The court dismissed Ruby’s argument by highlight-
ing that the CAP at issue in Selkirk was in fact enforceable under the ESA.107 
Moreover, the Center for Biological Diversity decision provides guidance 
on the matter of voluntary CAPs at issue in the Ninth Circuit case National 
Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, and in the Eleventh 
Circuit case Florida Key Deer v. Paulison.108 In Florida Key Deer, the Elev-
enth Circuit expressed concern that relying on voluntary measures to preserve 
endangered species leaves open the possibility of total inaction.109 In National 
                                                                                                                           
 98 816 F.2d at 1379. 
 99 Id. at 1388. 
 100 See id. at 1387 (noting that a change to the effects of the action requires reinitiation); id. at 
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 104 See Selkirk, 336 F.3d at 949, 956. 
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Wildlife Federation, the Ninth Circuit held that federal agencies cannot rely on 
future, non-binding CAP measures.110 The court in Center for Biological Di-
versity made clear that within the ESA scheme, cumulative effects amount to 
voluntary, non-binding measures and therefore cannot be relied upon to protect 
endangered species.111 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision lays out a clear rule that will strengthen the 
protection of endangered species by ensuring that federal agencies are ac-
countable for the implementation of CAP measures.112 This holding ensures 
that, within the Ninth Circuit, the protection of endangered species will not be 
left to the discretion of the private applicant and federal agencies other than the 
FWS.113 Congress did not intend to allow private parties and federal agencies 
to weigh their own priorities against the protection of endangered species.114 
The court’s decision implements Congress’s intent by placing the protection of 
endangered species within the purview of the ESA and the FWS, the statute 
and agency devoted to such protection.115 
CONCLUSION 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA), through a series of procedural and 
substantive requirements, imposes upon federal agencies a duty to conserve 
endangered and threatened species and their habitat. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bu-
reau of Land Management ensures that when a project involving federal agen-
cies is conditioned upon the implementation of Conservation Action Plans 
(CAPs), the CAP must be a formal component of the project itself and may not 
be considered just a cumulative effect of the project. This keeps the CAP with-
in the purview of the ESA and thus enforceable should the private party or fed-
eral action agency fail to implement the conservation measures. 
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